Summary:
In "De-growth vs a Green New Deal," Robert Pollin relies on the same blurring of distinctions that Robert Solow employed 46 years earlier in his condemnation of The Limits to Growth as "bad science." Nicholaus Georgescu-Roegen pointed out Solow's obfuscation in the article that inspired the term "degrowth." That historical context is vital for understanding why Pollin's "blueprint for ecological salvation" is no advance over Solow's. In "Is theEnd of the World at Hand" Solow scolded the "bad science" of The Limits to Growth report on the grounds that its authors' model assumed "that there are no built-in mechanisms by which approaching exhaustion [of resources] tends to turn off consumption gradually and in advance."[1] Solow cited increases in the productivity of natural resources to
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In "De-growth vs a Green New Deal," Robert Pollin relies on the same blurring of
distinctions that Robert Solow employed 46 years earlier in his condemnation of
The Limits to Growth as "bad
science." Nicholaus Georgescu-Roegen pointed out Solow's obfuscation in
the article that inspired the term "degrowth." That historical
context is vital for understanding why Pollin's "blueprint for ecological
salvation" is no advance over Solow's.In "De-growth vs a Green New Deal," Robert Pollin relies on the same blurring of distinctions that Robert Solow employed 46 years earlier in his condemnation of The Limits to Growth as "bad science." Nicholaus Georgescu-Roegen pointed out Solow's obfuscation in the article that inspired the term "degrowth." That historical context is vital for understanding why Pollin's "blueprint for ecological salvation" is no advance over Solow's. In "Is theEnd of the World at Hand" Solow scolded the "bad science" of The Limits to Growth report on the grounds that its authors' model assumed "that there are no built-in mechanisms by which approaching exhaustion [of resources] tends to turn off consumption gradually and in advance."[1] Solow cited increases in the productivity of natural resources to
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In "Is theEnd of the World at Hand" Solow scolded the "bad science" of The Limits
to Growth report on the grounds that its authors' model assumed "that
there are no built-in mechanisms by which approaching exhaustion [of resources]
tends to turn off consumption gradually and in advance."[1]
Solow cited increases in the productivity of natural resources to illustrate
the importance of the price system as the built-in mechanism of capitalism for
"registering and reacting to relative scarcity."
According to
Solow, between 1950 and 1970, consumption of iron in the U.S. increased by 20
percent while the GNP roughly doubled. Consumption of manganese rose by 30
percent. Copper consumption increased by one-third, as did lead and zinc
consumption. These increases represented productivity gains ranging from 2
percent per annum for copper, lead and zinc to 2.5 percent for iron. Meanwhile,
productivity of bituminous coal rose by 3 percent a year during the same
period.
There were, Solow
conceded, some "important exceptions, and unimportant exceptions."
Among the more important ones was petroleum, "GNP per barrel of oil was
about the same in 1970 as in 1951: no productivity increase there."
Nevertheless, Solow was confident that "no one can doubt that we will run
out of oil… [s]ooner or later, the productivity of oil will rise out of sight,
because the production and consumption of oil will eventually dwindle toward
zero, but real GNP will not."
Solow acknowledged
another important exception to his productivity argument: pollution. The price
system is flawed, he admitted, in its failure to charge polluters "for
using the environment to carry away waste." Thus "the waste-disposal
capacity of the environment goes unpriced; and that happens because it is owned
by all of us, as it should be." Solow saw this problem as easily
remediable through common sense regulation, user taxes and investment in pollution
abatement.
Georescu-Roegen's
response to Solow, in the 1975 article, "Energy and Economic Myths"
emphasized the distinction between growth and development:
…if we are talking about growth, strictly speaking, then the depletion of resources is inherent in the process by definition. Solow's exposition of why he thought The Limits to Growth was bad science relied on blurring the distinction between qualitative development and quantitative growth and counting the former as an instance of the latter. This sort of legerdemain is, of course, standard in so-called growth economics.[2]In 1979, Jacques Grinevald and Ivo Rens translated "Energy and Economic Myths" and included it with two other articles on bioeconomics in a book titled Demain La Décroissance: Entropie – Écologie – Économie.[3] The term, décroissance occurs in the translation of a section in which Georgescu-Roegen criticized what he considered "the greatest sin of the authors of The Limits" -- their exclusive focus on exponential growth, which fosters the delusion that "ecological salvation lies in the stationary state."
In opposition to
that view, Georgescu-Roegen argued, "the
necessary conclusion of the arguments in favor of that vision [of a
stationary state] is that the most
desirable state is not a stationary, but a declining one (emphasis in
original)." His argument was not that ecological salvation lies
instead in a declining (or "degrowth") economy. It was that there can
be no "blueprint for the ecological salvation of the human species."
as he elaborated in the subsequent paragraph:
Undoubtedly, the current growth must cease, nay, be reversed. But anyone who believes that he can draw a blueprint for the ecological salvation of the human species does not understand the nature of evolution, or even of history -- which is that of a permanent struggle in continuously novel forms, not that of a predictable, controllable physico-chemical process, such as boiling an egg or launching a rocket to the moon.
Pessimistic?
Perhaps, but it is less so if one keeps in mind Georgescu-Roegen's injunction
against blurring the distinction between quantitative development and
quantitative growth. There are no "built-in mechanisms," either of
the price system, of the regulatory and tax regime or of a Green New Deal that
can ensure ecological salvation because the latter requires not blueprint or a
formula but "permanent struggle in
continuously novel forms."
So how does
Pollin's Green New Deal stack up compared to Solow's "built-in
mechanism" of the price system? First, with regard to the distinction
between qualitative development and quantitative growth, Pollin gives no
indication of being aware of Georgescu-Roegen's (and Schumpeter's) distinction.
Instead, Pollin does distinguish between "some categories of economic
activity [that] should now grow massively" such as those associated with
clean energy and others, such as "the fossil-fuel industry that needs to
contract massively." Charitably, this shift may be interpreted as at least
tacitly acknowledging a qualitative development rather than simply a
quantitative growth/contraction. But because Pollin doesn't make that
distinction explicit, his concluding comparison of "average incomes"
from a degrowth scenario vs his Green New Deal is fundamentally flawed.
Pollin refers to the
process by which this simultaneous massive growth of clean energy and massive
contraction of fossil fuel is supposed to occur as "decoupling." Decoupling
is a synonym for what Solow called natural resource productivity. The
calculation is the same -- national income divided by the quantity of the
resource consumed or waste emitted. But decoupling,
as Pollin uses it and as it is commonly used, is a deceptive term. Economic
activity is not decoupled from the
consumption of fossil fuel, as Pollin claims. It is the rate of change of economic activity that is decoupled from the rate of change of fossil fuel consumption.
Resource
productivity (or rate-of-change decoupling) is analogous to labour productivity,
as Solow pointed out, and that parallel suggests a method for side-stepping the
measurement complications that arise from GDP. One can instead calculate the decoupling
of carbon dioxide emissions from aggregate employment. This alternative
restores the original sense of productivity measurement, which was in terms of
physical inputs and physical outputs rather than dollar values.[4]
I will discuss the measurement complications later, in connection with incomes
but first, let's review Pollin's optimistic account of the prospects for "absolute
decoupling."
According to
Pollin, citing a blog post from the World Resources Institute[5],
"between 2000 and 2014, twenty-one countries, including the US, Germany,
the UK, Spain and Sweden, all managed to absolutely decouple GDP growth from CO2
emissions…" This did not happen.
GDP growth was not decoupled from CO2
emissions. What was "decoupled" was GDP growth from emissions growth and, more precisely, from growth
in one commonly-used estimate of emissions.
Such claims need
to be examined for their attention to two important subtleties: territorial
emissions can be reduced by outsourcing those emissions to an offshore
supplier. What about emissions embodied in trade? And GDP growth incorporates
all kinds of distortions (we'll get to those). What about a more meaningful
indicator of the level of economic activity, such as total employment?
Of the twenty-one
countries claimed by the WRI to have achieved "absolute decoupling"
between 2000 and 2014. Slovakia, Switzerland and Ukraine had increases in their
consumption-based CO2 emissions that adjust for emissions embodied in trade.
Bulgaria's consumption-based emissions were unchanged from 2000-2014. Portugal,
Romania and Ukraine had declines in aggregate employment. Denmark had no
increase in employment. There was no consumption-based data for Uzbekistan and
its reported employment data (ILO) does not appear credible, so it can be
excluded from the analysis.[6]
That leaves 13
countries with "absolute decoupling" of the rate of change of employment
and the rate of change of consumption-based emissions. Of those 13, the Czech
Republic had reductions in average annual hours that exceeded the increase in
employment. Finland just squeaked through into absolute decoupling territory if
defined by changes in aggregate working hours and consumption-based Co2
emissions.
Twelve of the 21
countries touted by WRI meet the more rigorous rates of change decoupling
criteria. Again, no countries decoupled employment growth from CO2 emissions.
The average gap between growth in employment and decline in emissions, weighted
for the size of employed work force in 2014, was a bit less than half of the
gap between GDP growth and change in territorial emissions. (17.6 percent
versus 37 percent). That is 12 out of the 63 countries that had emissions of at
least 12 MtC/yr in 2000, as did Bulgaria. In other words, 51 other countries
among the top 63 did not have absolute decoupling of employment growth and
emissions decline.
In spite of those
21 or 12 countries that "absolutely decoupled" the rates of change of
GDP/employmnt and CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2014, tons of CO2 emitted
globally per employment-year rose from 9.5 to 11.4. That is neither an absolute
decoupling nor a relative one. That is a 20% intensification of emissions per job, a decline in the productivity of emissions. Meanwhile, China's
increase in consumption-based carbon dioxide emissions from 2000 to 2014 was 8
times the total decrease of all 21 counties for whom WRI proclaimed
"absolute decoupling" of "GDP and energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions."
 |
| Global CO2 emissions intensity of employment 2000 - 2014 |
On the Rebound
Pollin's treatment
of the so-called "rebound effect" is also inadequate. This
phenomenon, also known as the Jevons Paradox is not a separate, add-on effect
to productivity and should not be treated as such. It is an intrinsic part of
the "built-in mechanism" of the price system. Again, the use of
synonyms and euphemisms adds to the confusion. Just as decoupling is a synonym
for productivity, the productivity of resources is another way of referring to
the efficiency or economy of their use. When the use of a resource, such as a
fuel, is made more economical through technological innovation, its relative
cost may fall even though its absolute price may be rising. Thus increased
efficiency (or productivity) may lead to increased consumption. Separating out
the rebound effect from the analysis of productivity or of rate-of-change decoupling
is about as plausible as separating out the butter from a baked cake.
In formulating the
"paradox" of greater efficiency leading to increased consumption in
1865, W. S. Jevons described it as "principle recognised in many parallel
instances," particularly that of labour-saving machinery eventually
increasing employment.[7]
But fuel efficiency and labour saving machinery are not merely two
"parallel instances," they are two defining moments in a single,
continuous positive feedback loop.
Pollin speculates
that rebound effects from efficiency gains will be modest, at least in
developed countries, but he still argues it is crucial that "all
energy-efficiency gains be accompanied by complementary policies (as discussed
below), including setting a price on carbon emissions to discourage fossil-fuel
consumption." I would agree with the need for regulation or taxation to
discourage fossil-fuel consumption but would insist that putting a price on
carbon emissions will also put a damper on the jobs that increased fuel
consumption would otherwise generate. Until the link between fossil-fuel
consumption and jobs is decisively broken, you can't choose to dial down one
without affecting the other. One can't assume post-transition availability and
relative prices of clean energy sources during the transition!
This point is
missed in virtually every discussion of the rebound effect or Jevons Paradox.
There are not two, "parallel" rebound effects, one for fuel consumption
and one for employment. The rebound of employment drives the rebound of fuel
consumption, which in turn drives the rebound of employment. To decouple the
employment rebound from fossil fuel
consumption requires the fantasy that one can substitute clean energy supplies that do not yet exist for fossil fuels that
do.[8]
Comparing Average Incomes
In his criticism
of Peter Victor's Managing without Growth,
Pollin argues that per capita GDP in 2035 for a degrowth scenario would
"plummet" to little more than half the 2005 level, while under
Pollin's proposed clean energy investment programme, "average incomes
would roughly double." The second chapter of Darrell Huff's 1954 classic, How to Lie with Statistics is all about
averages, so I can't claim originality for this point: Pollin's otiose comparison
of average incomes under the two
scenarios says nothing but insinuates too much about distribution. To mix a few
metaphors, a rising tide lifts all boats as the sparrows pick away at the
remnants of "oats" that have "trickled down" from the
horse.
There are several
other egregious distortions in Pollin's comparison of "average
incomes": leisure time doesn't count as income and "average
income" doesn't say anything about what a person has to give up in time and
effort to receive it. GDP is not some magic cake that just appears and gets
doled out in equal-sized slices. As Maurice Dobb pointed out quite some time ago:
It is not aggregate earnings which are the measure of the benefit obtained by the worker, but his earnings in relation to the work he does — to his output of physical energy or his bodily wear and tear. Just as an employer is interested in his receipts compared with his outgoings, so the worker is presumably interested in what he gets compared with what he gives.[9]In comparing the projected average incomes of his clean energy investment programme and Peter Victor's degrowth scenario, Pollin appears to have set aside his earlier solidarity with the "values and concerns of degrowth advocates" particularly regarding GDP as a measure of wellbeing:
…there is no disputing that it fails to account for the production of environmental bads, as well as consumer goods. It does not account for unpaid labor, most of which is performed by women, and GDP per capita tells us nothing about the distribution of income or wealth.
Dividing up GDP into per capita income doesn't eliminate these problems
– or others. In 1995 the Atlantic Monthly published an article
that asked, "If the GDP is up, Why is America Down," a great
riff on the title of Richard Fariña's novel, Been Down So Long, It
Looks Like Up To Me.[10] That
article explained a lot of what's wrong with the economy and what's wrong with
economics:
Once you start asking 'what' as well as 'how much' -- that is, about quality instead of just quantity -- the premise of the national accounts as an indicator of progress begins to disintegrate, and along with it much of the conventional economic reasoning on which those accounts are based.
Questions about
distribution, about quality vs. quantity of goods, the production of
environmental "bads" and the disregarding of unpaid labor only skim
the surface of what is wrong with the GDP. Those questions focus on the
symptoms. A deeper understanding of the root causes reveals that the
discrepancy between the measurement and the thing that is purported to be
measured may be orders of magnitude.
Basic accounting errors of double-counting and
"asymmetric entry" abound in the compilation of National Income and
Product Accounts. These fundamental errors have been highlighted by Irving
Fisher, Simon Kuznets, Paul Samuelson, Roefie Hueting, Angelo Antoci, Stefano
Bartolini and others. These mismeasurements are not one-off discrepancies –
they also establish a positive feedback loop of incentives for cumulative misallocation
of resources and miscalculation of outcomes.
In his 1948 critique of the Commerce
Department's National Income and Product Accounts, Kuznets focused on the
double counting of intermediate goods, especially in the form of military
expenditures and government services that facilitate commercial activity.[11]
Hueting identified the problem of asymmetric entering in which expenditures on
remediating environmental damage adds to GDP even though no subtraction was
recorded for the damage itself.[12] Antoci
and Bartolini analyzed the cumulative role of negative externalities in
boosting GDP growth.[13]
It is not only that GDP doesn't distinguish between
goods and bads. Systematic mismeasurement puts a premium on expanding the proportion
of bads to goods.
Over a century ago, Fisher, one of the most
influential American economists in the early 20th century, maintained that
faulty definitions of income resulted in rampant double-counting errors. There
are three compelling reasons for not ignoring Fisher's views on income and
double counting. First, Fisher is an acknowledged pioneer of national income
accounting – his definitions of income need to be acknowledged, even if only to
show that they are not practicable or even are defective. Second, Fisher's
critique of the ill-defined "general concepts of income" addresses
precisely the "heterogeneous combination" of goods and services that
is standard in the GDP. Third, the recurrent examples of double counting
lend empirical support to Fisher's claim that the improper definition of income
inevitably results in such errors.
In The Nature of Capital and Income,
Fisher argued that the usual definitions of income fail one or both of the
tests of being both useful for scientific analysis and harmonizing with popular
usage.[14] The
pitfalls of those faulty definitions go largely unnoticed, making them
"all the more dangerous."
Fisher focused on two common concepts of income.
The first concept, money income, is reasonably adequate for commercial affairs
because the purpose of business is to make money. But making money is not the
purpose of households. Part of household production takes place outside of
monetary exchange and even monetary earnings have as their ultimate purpose the
purchase of food, clothing, housing and the like, which constitute the
household's real income.
The second concept, pertaining to real income, is
commonly defined in terms of both goods and services. Fisher criticized this
concept for its eclecticism and inconsistency. The procedure treats some items
-- such as fuel, food and apparel – as current consumption but apportions very
long-lived items such as dwellings as if they were being rented. This leaves a
variety of moderately durable items such as furniture or vehicles to be treated
in an ad hoc manner. Fisher concluded that "such a patchwork of
arbitrarily selected elements is incapable of furnishing any consistent,
reliable, and logical theory of income."
That patchwork is where double counting comes in.
Economists "have not known where to cease calling the concrete instrument
income and begin calling its use income instead. In their hesitation they have
in some cases ended by including both. By so doing they commit the fallacy of
double counting."
Fisher's alternative to the goods and services
concept was "to regard uniformly as income the service of a dwelling to
its owner, the service of a piano and the service of food; and in the same
uniform manner to exclude alike from the category of income the dwelling, the
piano, and even the food." The latter, he argued are "capital, not
income."
As logical and consistent as Fisher's definition of
income may appear in the abstract, it is hard to imagine how it could ever be
implemented in national income accounts. Monetary transactions occur when items
are purchased, not when they are actually consumed. Fisher's definition would
require a vast and highly subjective extension of financial record keeping.
Similarly, Commerce Department economists responded to Kuznets's critique,
conceding many of his points but stressing the technical difficulty of putting
an alternative into practice.
The arguments presented in defense of the goods and
services concept are usually framed in terms of expediency. Such expedients
have a limited shelf life, however. Typically, proponents of the monetized
goods and services concept cheerfully admit its perishability, logical frailty
and limited portability. "This process can never claim complete logical
watertightness," Colin Clark confessed in 1937, "but we can be
satisfied that it works well enough in practice for comparisons over periods up
to, say, twenty years, or for comparisons between communities whose ways of
living are not too widely different." Once the tabulations are up and
running, those caveats are ignored.
If you start with an accounting system that
systematically double counts some revenue items and doesn't count others, you
also have a system of perverse incentives to shift more and more effort,
investment and expenditures, over time, to the double-counted items because
that will project the illusion of more robust economic performance. For
apostles of growth, double counting is not so much a social accounting debacle
as it is a public relations triumph.
Investment Returns
Clearly Pollin presumes there is nothing inevitable
about the system of perverse incentives that engorges GDP and proposes that the
proceeds of growth can, in effect, be "siphoned off" to fund
investment in clean energy. In this vision, the transition to clean energy
would be funded by a portion of the increment of national income rather than
requiring diversion of a portion of the "principal" thus making
ecological salvation economically painless. Pollin's Green New Deal posits
investment in clean energy as a supplementary "built-in mechanism"
that will gradually wean GDP from dependence on fossil fuels (once "those
powerful vested interests", who "wield enormous political power"
have been defeated). The faster GDP grows, in this vision, the more rapid will
be the transition to clean energy because more growth will automatically result
in more investment.
The word "investment" does a lot a work
in the Pollin plan. What the term abbreviates is a complex process of
institutionalizing selection criteria for the funding of projects, project
design and budgeting, ranking and selection of competing projects, project oversight
and post-project evaluation of success in meeting objectives. There is not some
ready-made pool of self-evidently effective clean energy projects. The whole
process -- conducted presumably by hundreds of agencies operating in hundreds
of countries -- is subject to cronyism, administrative padding of costs, inept
selection criteria, mislabeling, miscalculation, lobbying, boondoggles,
administrative capture by powerful vested interests and outright embezzlement.
There is no "built-in mechanism" to guarantee a "trillion dollar
annual investment in clean energy" delivers what the name advertises.
In short, investment in clean energy is not "a
predictable, controllable physico-chemical process,
such as boiling an egg or launching a rocket to the moon." The successful
outcome of such a programme would require "a permanent struggle in
continuously novel forms" not simply the once-and-for-all defeat of those powerful
vested interests who wield enormous political power.
Deja vu all over again
Forty-six years ago, Robert Solow placed his faith
mainly in the "built-in mechanisms" of the price system, which, he
claimed, "tends to turn off consumption [of scarce
resources] gradually and in advance." Evidence for the success of this
mechanism was to be seen in the increasing productivity of a variety minerals
used as industrial inputs. But pollution presented an exception to this rule
because it escaped the price system. Solow offered a remedy for that defect –
investment in pollution abatement:
An active pollution abatement policy would cost perhaps $50 billion a year by 2000, which would be about 2 percent of GNP by then. That is a small investment of resources: you can see how small it is when you consider that GNP grows by 4 percent or so every year, on the average. Cleaning up air and water would entail a cost that would be a bit like losing one-half of one year’s growth, between now and the year 2000.
Robert Pollin's critique of degrowth and his proposed alternative of a Green
New Deal unwittingly recycles Robert Solow's 1973 rebuttal to The Limits
to Growth. Pollin substitutes the euphemistic "decoupling" for
Solow's more conventional "productivity." He acknowledges criticism
of GDP and then ignores those criticisms when comparing degrowth and Green New
Deal scenarios. He updates, refines and globalizes his investment target to one
trillion dollars from Solow's $50 billion, although both figures are presented
as approximately the same percentage of annual gross product.
Pollin's one major digression from the Solow blueprint is a curiously
nostalgic one. He stresses the need to defeat "powerful vested
interests" of the fossil fuel industry who "wield enormous political
power" and charges the degrowth perspective with "the critical error
of ignoring the reality of neoliberalism in the contemporary world." Yet Pollin
makes no suggestion about how those vested interests might be defeated or
"how to put capitalism back on the leash that prevailed during the ‘golden
age’ [before the era of neoliberalism]."
Speaking at a symposium on The
Limits to Growth at Lehigh University in October 1972, Robert Solow could
not have foreseen the military coup in Chile the following September that
ushered in the regime of neoliberalism nor the OPEC oil embargo a month later
that ushered in a new era of petro-political economy.
[1] Robert Solow, 'Is the End of the World at Hand?" Challenge, March/April 1973, pp. 39-50.
[2] Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 'Energy and Economic Myths', Southern Economic Journal, January 1975,
pp. 347-381.
[3] Jacques Grinevald
and Ivo Rens, Demain La Décroissance:
Entropie – Écologie – Économie, Lausanne, 1979.
[4] Fred Block and Gene A. Burns, 'Productivity as a Social Problem:
The Uses and Misuses of Social Indicators', American
Sociological Review, December, 1986, pp. 767-780.
[5] Nate Aden, ‘The Roads to Decoupling: 21 Countries Are Reducing Carbon
Emissions While Growing GDP’, World Resources Institute blog, 5 April 2016.
[6] Consumption-based CO2 emissions estimates are from 'The Global
Carbon Budget 2017' updated from Peters, GP, Minx, JC, Weber, CL and Edenhofer,
O 2011. Growth in emission transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, 8903-8908. Employment
estimates are from International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT, Key Indicators
of the Labour Market, Status in Employment.
[7] William Stanley Jevons, The
Coal Question, London, 1865.
[8] On decoupling as fantasy, see Robert Fletcher & Crelis Rammelt,
'Decoupling: A Key Fantasy of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda', Globalizations,
14:3, pp. 450-467. They write:
"[The]
dramatic disjuncture between the blind optimism of the decoupling proposal and
the daunting (thermodynamic, financial, and distributive) obstacles in the face
of its realization suggests that the concept works as a Lacanian fantasy,
presenting both the prospect of sustainable development at some unknown future
point and a convenient a priori explanation for why this aim is not achieved. …
"The pressing danger, of course, is that even if decoupling is
infeasible, it will take some time for this to be demonstrated to the
satisfaction of its proponents as well as those merely using it as a
smokescreen to continue business as usual for as long as they still can. Thus,
the decoupling fantasy may allow us to maintain an increasingly destructive
path with both the promise of success and demonstration of its impossibility
deferred into the future."
[9] Maurice Dobb, Wages,
Cambridge, 1928.
[10] Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead and Jonathan Rowe 'If the GDP is up,
Why is America Down', Atlantic Monthly,
October 1995.
[11] Simon Kuznets, 'National Income: A New Version', The Review of Economics and Statistics,
August 1948.
[12] Roefie Hueting, 'Three Persistent Myths in the Environmental
Debate', Ecological Economics, 1996,
pp. 81-88.
[13] Angelo Antoci and Stefano Bartolini, 'Negative externalities,
defensive expenditures and labour supply in an evolutionary context', Environment and Development Economics,
October 2004.
[14] Irving Fisher, The Nature of
Capital and Income, New York, 1906.