Why we need an elected President

The starting point for both monarchists and supporters of a minimal republic. is the claim that ‘the existing system has worked well’. This is incorrect in two crucial respects

First, the current system gives the Prime Minister too much power, and this power has been increasingly abused in Australia and other Westminster systems. The discovery that Scott Morrison had been secretly sworn in to five separate ministries showed that, if the Governor-General had any role beyond that of a rubber stamp, this role had ceased to apply (except for the possibility, discussed later of a repeat of 1975). The increased use of ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, combined with the assumption that the Governor-General will automatically comply with their use by the PM has steadily undermined Parliamentary control.

In the UK and Canada, Prime Ministers who have lost their majorities in Parliament have prorogued Parliament, with the acquiescence of the Queen and Governor-General respectively. Johnson’s action was later ruled to be illegal, but the monarch did nothing to stop it. We need a President with sufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the PM.

Second, the issues raised by the 1975 constitutional crisis have never been resolved. Should the Senate choose, once again, to block Supply, the same problems would arise. The GG would have to either comply with emergency measures proposed by the PM, or repeat the deception practised by Kerr in 1975 to avoid being sacked. Alternatively, the PM might act pre-emptively, asking the King to appoint a puppet GG (perhaps even the PM themself) before the Senate had time to create a crisis.

The replacement of the GG with a President, secure from dismissal by the PM would

alleviate these problems. But this would depend on the President having sufficient legitimacy to rule against the PM where necessary. That legitimacy would be more secure if the President were directly elected than if they were appointed by a backroom deal between the major parties.

First, there is the default assumption in a democracy that the people should choose their rulers. Those who argue that the voters will inevitably get the choice wrong, for example by following the dictates of the Murdoch Press, ought to take the argument to its logical conclusion and support the (essentially) random procedure of choosing a monarch by primogeniture.

Second, there is the practical question of which procedure is more likely to select a political partisan.

The proposal that the President should be chosen by 2/3 majority of the House of Representatives is far from foolproof. Of the Federal elections since 1975, two (1975 and 1977) have produced governments with 2/3 majorities while 1996 came close. The same outcome has been seen in many state elections in that time. The 58 seats won by the LNP in 2022 are barely enough to give them a veto.

On the other hand, there is not much risk that either of the major parties could gain enough support to elect a partisan President, especially given a general presumption that the office should be non-partisan. Suppose that Labor, currently well ahead in the polls, nominated an obvious partisan. Provided the LNP did not follow suit, a respected independent would easily defeat the Labor candidate. Even if both major parties ran candidates, one of them would probably finish third, and an independent would win on preferences.

The final argument is that the idea of a nominated President has already been put to the people and resoundingly defeated. This failed model should not be given a second chance, just because it would suit the political class.

Would the President be too powerful? There is no reason to suppose so. The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well. Even though candidates for President have been supported by political parties, they appear not to have acted as partisans in office, and have left the running of the country to the PM.