by ‘Observation is theory-laden’ — fashionable philosophical rubbish Now our slogan is that observation is theory-laden … The slogan cannot be literally true. If anything is ‘theory- laden’ it cannot be observation but rather statements made on the basis of observation. Observation is simply an act that humans and other creatures perform, a special kind of event or process occurring in the nervous systems of humans and other creatures. How can an act or event or process be ‘theory-laden’? It is not seeing (or perceiving or observing) which might be theory-laden, but rather seeing (or perceiving or observing) that something is the case. The cat may see the TV set, as shown by his avoiding it while chasing the mouse. What the cat presumably does not do is see that it is a TV set, because to do that the cat must know what a TV set is or possess the concept of a TV set … Neglect of this point has produced a lot of bad philosophy. It has led philosophers to claim that observers with different concepts or theories see different things. The Westerner sees the TV set but the Kalahari bushman does not. And this in turn has led to the idea that what is in the world for us to see depends upon what concepts or theories we possess.
Topics:
Lars Pålsson Syll considers the following as important: Theory of Science & Methodology
This could be interesting, too:
Lars Pålsson Syll writes Kausalitet — en crash course
Lars Pålsson Syll writes Randomization and causal claims
Lars Pålsson Syll writes Race and sex as causes
Lars Pålsson Syll writes Randomization — a philosophical device gone astray
‘Observation is theory-laden’ — fashionable philosophical rubbish
Now our slogan is that observation is theory-laden …
The slogan cannot be literally true. If anything is ‘theory- laden’ it cannot be observation but rather statements made on the basis of observation. Observation is simply an act that humans and other creatures perform, a special kind of event or process occurring in the nervous systems of humans and other creatures. How can an act or event or process be ‘theory-laden’?
It is not seeing (or perceiving or observing) which might be theory-laden, but rather seeing (or perceiving or observing) that something is the case. The cat may see the TV set, as shown by his avoiding it while chasing the mouse. What the cat presumably does not do is see that it is a TV set, because to do that the cat must know what a TV set is or possess the concept of a TV set …
Neglect of this point has produced a lot of bad philosophy. It has led philosophers to claim that observers with different concepts or theories see different things. The Westerner sees the TV set but the Kalahari bushman does not. And this in turn has led to the idea that what is in the world for us to see depends upon what concepts or theories we possess. Thus metaphorical talk about how the ‘world of the Westerner’ differs from the ‘world of the Kalahari bushman’, talk which does no harm when it is merely metaphorical, comes to be taken literally and to do a great deal of harm. It leads to conceptual idealism, in which the real world disappears and is supplanted by a series of different worlds whose varying contents are a function of the concepts and theories of those who live in them. This can entertain : as well as familiar worlds with TV sets in them, there are exciting worlds contaIning spooks and spirits, ghosts. and witches, not to mention stationary earths, substances contain- ing phlogiston, and whatever else can be ‘observed’ by people with false beliefs. But all this, though entertaining, is just philosophical rubbish.