by Via Peter Hartcher in the Nine papers, I learned the other day that Albanese snubbed President Prabowo of Indonesia to meet King Charles. The immediate decision before the Albanese government was how to deal with two important heads of state asking for attention at almost exactly the same time. The prime minister had a long-standing invitation to the inauguration of the new president of Indonesia in Jakarta on Sunday, and a request for a visit by the British monarch to begin on the same weekend. This ought to be have been a no-brainer. As PM of Australia, Albanese should have been able to set the dates for a visit from Charles in his capacity as King of Australia. And, as Hartcher points out, he could have fitted in both engagements with a flying visit to Jakarta. Instead,
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Via Peter Hartcher in the Nine papers, I learned the other day that Albanese snubbed President Prabowo of Indonesia to meet King Charles.
The immediate decision before the Albanese government was how to deal with two important heads of state asking for attention at almost exactly the same time. The prime minister had a long-standing invitation to the inauguration of the new president of Indonesia in Jakarta on Sunday, and a request for a visit by the British monarch to begin on the same weekend.
This ought to be have been a no-brainer. As PM of Australia, Albanese should have been able to set the dates for a visit from Charles in his capacity as King of Australia. And, as Hartcher points out, he could have fitted in both engagements with a flying visit to Jakarta. Instead, he sent Richard Marles.
Here’s where Hartcher’s piece gets interesting. He makes the point that, thanks to AUKUS, our relationship with the UK has gone from being a sentimental relic to a central strategic commitment. As Hartcher mentions, this brings to mind the longstanding struggle over whether Australia is really an Asian nation, a claim firmly denied by Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohammed. He doesn’t mention, though it would have amplified his point, the view expressed by George W. Bush and John Howard, that Australia should act as a US “deputy sheriff” in the region.
Hartcher ends optimistically, saying that since Prabowo (in his previous capacity as Defence Minister) signed a defence agreement with Marles, the attendance of the latter at a major ceremonial event would not be a problem.
So Australia finds itself in the fortunate position of being able to draw on both its history and its geography, forming intensified strategic arrangements with both Britain and Indonesia, simultaneously. Not torn in two directions, but strengthened by each.
This strikes me as massively over-optimistic. The governments of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, have generally been negative about AUKUS, and popular feeling is almost certainly more hostile still. Ostentatious preference for our former Imperial overlords over our neighbours in the region is unlikely to be helpful.
Perhaps none of this would matter if AUKUS had a clear strategic rationale, with demonstrable benefits for the region as a whole. But for Morrison, it was much more a matter of loyalty to the Anglosphere than of any coherent analysis. Now that Albanese has followed suit, as part of what Hartcher describes as a “remedial post-Voice effort to persuade the electorate that he does, in fact, identify with the Australian mainstream”, the racial overtones of this exercise are undeniable.
AUKUS was bound to be an economic disaster. It looks likely to become a diplomatic and strategic disaster as well.