Tag Archives: Theory of Science & Methodology

Bayesianism — a scientific cul-de-sac The bias toward the superficial and the response to extraneous influences on research are both examples of real harm done in contemporary social science by a roughly Bayesian paradigm of statistical inference as the epitome of empirical argument. For instance the dominant attitude toward the sources of black-white differential in United States unemployment rates (routinely the rates are in a two to one ratio) is...

Bayesianism — a patently absurd approach to science Mainstream economics nowadays usually assumes that agents that have to make choices under conditions of uncertainty behave according to Bayesian rules (preferably the ones axiomatised by Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937) or Savage (1954)) — that is, they maximise expected utility with respect to some subjective probability measure that is continually updated according to Bayes theorem. If not, they are...

On the use of logic and mathematics in economics Logic, n. The art of thinking and reasoning in strict accordance with the limitations and incapacities of the human misunderstanding. The basic of logic is the syllogism, consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion – thus: Major Premise: Sixty men can do a piece of work sixty times as quickly as one man. Minor Premise: One man can dig a post-hole in sixty seconds; Therefore- Conclusion: Sixty...

The truly scientific attitude I recall, with sadness, a comment made to me by the author of a well-known textbook. Upon being asked whether he accepted my analysis of demand theory as presented first in 1948, the reply was positive. He added that it would not be included in his advanced textbook because “it would upset too many things and be too disturbing, i.e., Dicta non movere.” So much for the acceptance of new scientific results and for a truly...

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Noam Chomsky on postmodern grotesquerie .[embedded content]

Hans Albert turns 100 .[embedded content] Clearly, it is possible to interpret the ‘presuppositions’ of a theoretical system … not as hypotheses, but simply as limitations to the area of application of the system in question. Since a relationship to reality is usually ensured by the language used in economic statements, in this case the impression is generated that a content-laden statement about reality is being made, although the system is fully immunized...

When should we trust science? .[embedded content] Using formal mathematical modelling, mainstream economists sure can guarantee that the conclusions hold given the assumptions. However the validity we get in abstract model-worlds does not warrant transfer to real-world economies. Validity may be good, but it isn’t — as Nancy Cartwright so eloquently argues — enough. From a realist perspective, both relevance and soundness are sine qua non. In their search...

On logic and science Suppose you conducted an observational study to identify the effect of heart transplant A on death Y and that you assumed no unmeasured confounding given disease severity L. A critic of your study says “the inferences from this observational study may be incorrect because of potential confounding.” The critic is not making a scientific statement, but a logical one. Since the findings from any observational study may be confounded, it is...

Why economic models do not explain In physics, we have theories and centuries of experience and experiments that show how gravity makes bodies move. In economics, we know there is nothing equivalent. Mainstream economists necessarily have to load their theories and models with sets of auxiliary structural assumptions to get any results at all in their models. So why then do mainstream economists keep on pursuing this modelling project? Mainstream ‘as if’...