by Using counterfactuals in causal inference I have argued that there are four major problems in the way of using the counterfactual account for causal inference. Of the four, I argued that the fourth — the problem of indeterminacy — is likely to be the most damaging: To the extent that some of the causal principles that connect counterfactual antecedent and consequent are genuinely indeterministic, the counterfactual will be of the “might have been” and not the “would have been” kind … The causal principles describing a situation of interest must be weak enough — that is, contain genuinely indeterministic relations so that the counterfactual antecedent can be implemented … At the same time, the principles must be strong enough — that is, contain enough
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Lars Pålsson Syll considers the following as important: Economics
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Using counterfactuals in causal inference
I have argued that there are four major problems in the way of using the counterfactual account for causal inference. Of the four, I argued that the fourth — the problem of indeterminacy — is likely to be the most damaging: To the extent that some of the causal principles that connect counterfactual antecedent and consequent are genuinely indeterministic, the counterfactual will be of the “might have been” and not the “would have been” kind …
The causal principles describing a situation of interest must be weak enough — that is, contain genuinely indeterministic relations so that the counterfactual antecedent can be implemented … At the same time, the principles must be strong enough — that is, contain enough deteerministic relations so that the consequent follows from the antecedent together with the principles … What is required is enough indeterministic causal relations so that the antecedent can be implemented and enough deterministic relations so that the consequent (or its negation) follows.
Evidently, this is a tall order: Why would deterministic and indeterministic causal principles be distributed in just this way? Wouldn’t it seem likely that to the extent we are willing to believe that the antecedent event was contingent, we are also willing to believe that the outcome remained contingent given the antecedent event? …
A final argument in favor of counterfactuals even in the context of establishing causation is that there are no alternatives that are unequivocally superior. The main alternative to the counterfactual account is process tracking. But process tracking is itself not without problems … For all its difficulties, counterfactual speculation may sometimes be the only way to make causal inferences about singular events.