by How is a philosophy of science possible? What is the relation between science and philosophy? Do they compete with one another or speak of different worlds? Neither position is acceptable … Philosophy is distinguished by the kinds of considerations and arguments it employs. It does not consider a world apart from that of the various sciences. Rather it considers just that world, but from the standpoint of what can be established about it by a priori argument … Philosophy, like science, produces knowledge. But it is knowledge of the necessary conditions for the production of knowledge — second-order knowledge, if you like. If philosophy is, as I believe it can be, a conceptual science, then like any science it ought to be able to tell us something we did
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Lars Pålsson Syll considers the following as important: Theory of Science & Methodology
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How is a philosophy of science possible?
What is the relation between science and philosophy? Do they compete with one another or speak of different worlds? Neither position is acceptable …
Philosophy is distinguished by the kinds of considerations and arguments it employs. It does not consider a world apart from that of the various sciences. Rather it considers just that world, but from the standpoint of what can be established about it by a priori argument …
Philosophy, like science, produces knowledge. But it is knowledge of the necessary conditions for the production of knowledge — second-order knowledge, if you like. If philosophy is, as I believe it can be, a conceptual science, then like any science it ought to be able to tell us something we did not already know: it ought to be able to surprise us. For, as Marx astutely observed, ‘all science would be superfluous if the outward appearances and essences of things directly coincided.’