by From Dean Baker It’s probably too simple and obvious to be worth mentioning, but it seems none of the news coverage on the suits against opioid manufacturers say that the reason that companies like Purdue Pharma and Johnson & Johnson had so much incentive to push their drugs was that the government gave them patent monopolies that allowed them to sell their products for prices that were far above the free market level. While generic manufacturers also made money on opioids, the largest profits were made the brand manufacturers, who also did the most pushing. One of the unintended consequences of government granted patent monopolies is that it gives companies incentive to mislead physicians and the general public about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs. The costs from the
Topics:
Dean Baker considers the following as important: Uncategorized
This could be interesting, too:
Merijn T. Knibbe writes ´Fryslan boppe´. An in-depth inspirational analysis of work rewarded with the 2024 Riksbank prize in economic sciences.
Peter Radford writes AJR, Nobel, and prompt engineering
Lars Pålsson Syll writes Central bank independence — a convenient illusion
Eric Kramer writes What if Trump wins?
from Dean Baker
It’s probably too simple and obvious to be worth mentioning, but it seems none of the news coverage on the suits against opioid manufacturers say that the reason that companies like Purdue Pharma and Johnson & Johnson had so much incentive to push their drugs was that the government gave them patent monopolies that allowed them to sell their products for prices that were far above the free market level. While generic manufacturers also made money on opioids, the largest profits were made the brand manufacturers, who also did the most pushing.
One of the unintended consequences of government granted patent monopolies is that it gives companies incentive to mislead physicians and the general public about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs. The costs from the resulting improper care can be enormous, as we showed in a short paper five years ago.
This should be a strong argument for alternatives to patent financed research, such as the $40 billion in direct public funding that now goes through the National Institutes of Health. Unfortunately, the idea of alternatives to patent-financed pharmaceutical research, which would allow all new drugs to sell at generic prices, saving close to $400 billion annually (1.8 percent of GDP), is too radical for U.S. politicians.