Taking on Boeing, A senior manager for Boeing’s 737 MAX program testimony about Boeing manufacturing issues and its supply chain. The fatal MAX 8 crashes occurred in 2018 and 2019. He decided to speak up publicly and was then called to testify before Congress on the problems he says he saw up close. The story is at Politico and is accessible. I wanted to read the Congressional Investigation hearing. Below is part of it and an easy read. I have italicized parts of it which I thought to be important. I will add to this with another post or more as needed . . . an easy read. I do not fly Boeing either. Instead, we fly the AirBus A320 as it is roomier than Boeing’s available planes. Note the issues called out by Representative DeFazio.
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Taking on Boeing,
A senior manager for Boeing’s 737 MAX program testimony about Boeing manufacturing issues and its supply chain.
The fatal MAX 8 crashes occurred in 2018 and 2019. He decided to speak up publicly and was then called to testify before Congress on the problems he says he saw up close. The story is at Politico and is accessible. I wanted to read the Congressional Investigation hearing. Below is part of it and an easy read.
I have italicized parts of it which I thought to be important. I will add to this with another post or more as needed . . . an easy read. I do not fly Boeing either. Instead, we fly the AirBus A320 as it is roomier than Boeing’s available planes.
Note the issues called out by Representative DeFazio. More Later.
Representative Peter DeFazio
Mr. DeFazio: With that, then, I would recognize myself for
the first round of questions.
Administrator Dickson, we know you weren’t there. But
obviously, I expect that you and your staff have put a
substantial amount of energy into trying to determine what
happened and how it happened, as you are charged with making it
work right in the future.
So I have got to ask about this TARAM1 analysis, which was
done on December 3, 2018. Again, you weren’t there. Mr. Bahrami
was there. He was head of safety. And he met with me and Mr.
Larsen and I can’t remember who else might have been there, and
told us this was a one-off accident in February.
Yet this analysis, which I thought the staff was going to
put up, was–thank you–was available at that time. He
apparently says he was unaware of it. He knew there was such a
process, but he didn’t know they had evaluated this plane and
this system. But this analysis says that–this is post-Lion
Air–that in the lifetime of these aircraft, in operation, they
predicted there would be a potential of 15 fatal crashes.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. I am not aware of any other
certified transport aircraft that has such an analysis. I mean,
the normal analysis is 10 to the minus 9. This far exceeds
that. And I question why, given this TARAM–and I don’t know
where it went since it didn’t go to the head of safety–why the
aircraft wasn’t grounded once this analysis was done, as
opposed to allowing the plane to fly while Boeing worked on a
fix.
We have talked a lot about being a data-driven organization
with you and former Administrator Elwell when we had the second
incident, when the plane stayed up yet for another couple of
days, and the assumptions that were made here is only 1 out of
100 pilots wouldn’t react properly and effectively in that 10-
second period. Yet in the two instances extant–well, there
were actually three. There was a triggering, which was
recovered, in Indonesia. Then there was a triggering which
wasn’t recovered, and then Ethiopia. So we have essentially a
33-percent success rate. But even after the first, we had a 50-
percent success rate.
I am just wondering, I mean, in retrospect do you think it
should have been grounded after Lion Air, given this TARAM
analysis?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for your question, Mr.
Chairman. And I will say at the outset, as you noted, I was not
at the FAA when this analysis was done. However, I want to
advocate for my people. And they need–we are a data-driven
organization, as you said, and I know this–with all due
respect, any indication that any level of accidents is
acceptable in any analysis is not reflective of the 45,000
dedicated professionals at the FAA, whether they are involved
in air traffic or aviation safety. So I want to make that
abundantly clear. That is absolutely our highest priority.
Having said that, the reason that we have the safest
airspace in the U.S. in the world has been through decades of
developing data systems and decisionmaking tools that will
allow us to make the best decisions, and prioritize in the
interests of safety.
So remember, the information that was available at the time
was we really didn’t know what the root cause of the accident–
—
Mr. DeFazio. If I could, Mr. Administrator, I understand.
But I have only got 10 minutes, and I have at least a couple
other questions.
So OK, you are not going to say anything definitive. I
would hope you would look into the distribution—-
Mr. Dickson. Of course.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. Of this TARAM. It didn’t come to
the attention of the head of safety, he tells us, so I don’t
know where it went or who had access to it and what they may
have advocated. I think it is a pretty critical thing. And
again, I am not aware of any other aircraft where this sort of
analysis has found something that is going to cause crashes
inevitably and been allowed to fly. I mean, it just doesn’t
meet your standards. So I appreciate the fact that you are
going to look into that and refuse that.
Now, I want to ask, again, I am concerned about Boeing’s
influence over–particularly, it seems like this all stops in
the regional offices. We will find out with further interviews
with FAA employees. But again, with 7 hours with Mr. Bahrami,
he is not aware of any of the issues we raised outside that
were–where decisions were made up in Washington State.
And there are two issues regarding lightning protection on
the 787, where the plane was certified for production with the
lightning protection. Boeing decided to strip the lightning
protection off, and after they produced 40 airplanes, they came
to the FAA and said, “Oh, by the way, you certified it with
lightning protection. We have taken it off. We would like you
to change your decision that it is necessary.” And again,
safety analysts objected, and they were overruled by a local
manager.
And then the rudder: The rudder issue was actually seven
safety analysts said, “No, you need to relocate the rudder
controls,” and we do have photos of what happens when you lose
rudder controls on an airplane, particularly on climb-out or at
a critical time. I wish the staff would put that slide up,
please, if they are listening. And that is a critical thing.
Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. And they were upheld at two
levels of review. So in total, we had 14 people at the FAA say,
they should relocate or better protect the rudder controls in
the wing, given this large new engine and the potential for
uncontained failure and fragmentation. And they were overruled
by a single manager, apparently again at the local level.
This causes concern on my part, that there doesn’t seem to
be–and we haven’t found yet–that there are levels of review
beyond the local office. Are you going to be looking at that
issue or problem as part of a solution?
Mr. Dickson. Yes. Well, thank you for the question, Mr.
Chairman. And I think that it is important to understand that
as we work through these processes and when you have technical
people involved in discussions, these processes by design
encourage debate. And there are differences of opinion as we
work through the processes.
And ultimately, remember that the managers who were
involved in these decisions are themselves, are themselves
experts, and there are times when they may have been overruled.
And it is not a matter, in my view, of what the applicant, or
the manufacturer in this case, wants.
It is really a matter of letting the process work. And
ultimately, the decision needs to be made on behalf of the
agency, and on occasion, that maybe the manager that has a
broader view that may be able to make that decision. I do think
that there are some improvements that we can put in place.
Aviation safety is working, as I mentioned, on just—-
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. And one last
question–I am running out of time and do not want to abuse my
privileges here–Boeing self-certified and installed defective
slats on 137 applications, and you just announced a $4 million
civil fine for this deliberate abuse. And we have heard a lot
of other things about production pressures, and we will hear
more about that from the second panel.
I am concerned that will you look at these issues. And also
we will hear from the second panel about concerns about whether
or not sensors were installed, the AOA sensors installed
properly because of production pressures, calibrated properly
because of production pressures. Again, I have concern.
Again, and I do not get the sense thus far that you are
ready to go there, that we may have a captive regulatory
problem in the field offices. Because there are an awful lot of
decisions that have gone in Boeing’s favor, overruling a whole
lot. The 787 had a safety specialist say, “Hey, you can’t put
a lithium battery in that plane without putting it in a steel
box and venting it over the side.” Overruled. Guess what? The
plane gets grounded for 2 months because, hey, you have got to
put it in a steel box and vent it over the side.
There have been an awful lot of people who seem to have
been pressing it and right, and the question is, maybe this
needs to go beyond the local office when we are talking about
safety-critical systems.
And with that, I have run out of time. But I hope you will
look at that issue. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Administrator.
Notes:
- The Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology (TARAM) is a process for calculating risk associated with continued operational safety issues in the U.S. transport airplane fleet. TARAM is important because its risk-analysis calculations are used when making determinations of unsafe conditions in transport airplanes and when selecting and implementing corrective actions. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022.
- THE BOEING 737 MAX: Examining the Federal Aviation Administration’s Oversight of the Aircraft’s Certification. Congress.gov | Library of Congress, December 11, 2029.
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