Brexit macroeconomics

Summary:
I’ve received several thoughtful responses from economists I respect, all making a particular argument about the effects of Brexit-induced uncertainty. It goes like this: right now, firms don’t know how closely Britain will be tied to Europe, so it makes sense for them to postpone investments until the situation clarifies … Doesn’t this argument suggest essentially the same effects from any policy negotiation whose end result isn’t known? Why don’t we say that the possibilities of TPP or TTIP are contractionary, because firms have an incentive to postpone investment decisions until they know whether these agreements actually happen? Somehow, though I’ve never heard anyone argue for the depressing effects of pending trade liberalisation … Could I be wrong about all of this? Of course! But everyone really should ask where the consensus about Brexit macro is coming from.

Topics:
Lars Pålsson Syll considers the following as important: Economics

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