Any fool can reduce debt in the short-term by selling their house, paying off the mortgage and renting a place. Whether you should do that depends upon whether the cost of renting is cheaper than that of borrowing, all things considered. That’s a tricky calculation. But it’s one that households wouldn’t make if they were tied by that “non-negotiable” fiscal rule; they would just cut their mortgage and not worry about the fact that they’ll have to pay the rent after five years. This, though, is exactly what Reeves is doing in thinking of handing over future toll revenues to private financiers; she’s giving up long-term income in order to meet a short-term target. As the Institute for Government has said, the fiscal rule “does little to promote fiscal sustainability.” No
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Lars Pålsson Syll considers the following as important: Economics
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Any fool can reduce debt in the short-term by selling their house, paying off the mortgage and renting a place. Whether you should do that depends upon whether the cost of renting is cheaper than that of borrowing, all things considered. That’s a tricky calculation. But it’s one that households wouldn’t make if they were tied by that “non-negotiable” fiscal rule; they would just cut their mortgage and not worry about the fact that they’ll have to pay the rent after five years.
This, though, is exactly what Reeves is doing in thinking of handing over future toll revenues to private financiers; she’s giving up long-term income in order to meet a short-term target. As the Institute for Government has said, the fiscal rule “does little to promote fiscal sustainability.” No sensible household would behave like that.
Such an absurdity is the result of another absurdity in the fiscal rules; they ignore the fact that balance sheets have two sides – assets as well as liabilities.
A sensible household would want to increase debt if in doing so it could buy an asset which yielded more than the cost of debt (adjusting for risk!) Buying a house – thereby saving on rent – or a business can be perfectly reasonable things to do.
Not so for Labour. Reeves has said that nationalizing utilities “just doesn’t stack up against our fiscal rules”. Which is drivel. Many utility companies have dividend yields well above the 1% it would cost to buy them, so nationalizing them would generate a net revenue for the government.
No household would rule out investing in a business on the basis of the level of its debt without also considering the cost of that debt relative to the income stream it is buying. But that’s what Reeves is doing.
Of course, there are good arguments against nationalization, one being whether the companies would continue to yield so much under state control***. But this is exactly the question a sensible household would ask: is this business really as good as it seems? Can we manage it well? It would not rule out buying merely by saying “debt, aaarghh!”
The pros and cons of public debt have been put forward for as long as the phenomenon itself has existed, but it has, notwithstanding that, not been possible to reach anything close to consensus on the issue — at least not in a long-time-horizon perspective. One has as a rule not even been able to agree on whether public debt is a problem, and if — when it is or how to best tackle it. Some of the more prominent reasons for this non-consensus are the complexity of the issue, the mingling of vested interests, ideology, psychological fears, the uncertainty of calculating and estimating inter-generational effects, etc., etc.
Today there seems to be a rather widespread consensus that public debt is acceptable as long as it doesn’t increase too much and too fast. If the public debt-GDP ratio becomes higher than X % the likelihood of debt crisis and/or lower growth increases.
But in discussing within which margins public debt is feasible, the focus, however, is solely on the upper limit of indebtedness, and very few ask the question of maybe there is also a problem if public debt becomes too low.
The government’s ability to conduct an “optimal” public debt policy may be negatively affected if public debt becomes too small. To guarantee a well-functioning secondary market in bonds it is essential that the government has access to a functioning market. If turnover and liquidity in the secondary market become too small, increased volatility and uncertainty will in the long run lead to an increase in borrowing costs. Ultimately there’s even a risk that market makers would disappear, leaving bond market trading to be operated solely through brokered deals. As a kind of precautionary measure against this eventuality it may be argued – especially in times of financial turmoil and crises — that it is necessary to increase government borrowing and debt to ensure – in the long run – good borrowing preparedness and a sustained (government) bond market.
When applied to the question of public debt, it can be argued that thriftiness and an exaggerated eagerness to pay back debt lead to counterfinal results — instead of shrinking the debt mountain, it will in fact only make it bigger.
A starving state reduces the economic activity level, incomes, investments, and tax revenues. Unemployment increases and unemployment payments grow — ultimately resulting in even higher public debt.
Today most mainstream economists are focusing on problems following public debt being too high. Based on Keynes’ reasoning, yours truly would rather argue the focus ought to be on problems following public debt being too low.
For although the amount of his own saving is unlikely to have any significant influence on his own income, the reactions of the amount of his consumption on the incomes of others makes it impossible for all individuals simultaneously to save any given sums. Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption will so affect incomes that the attempt necessarily defeats itself. It is, of course, just as impossible for the community as a whole to save less than the amount of current investment, since the attempt to do so will necessarily raise incomes to a level at which the sums which individuals choose to save add up to a figure exactly equal to the amount of investment.