by Summary:
I say the challenge in Robin's final sentence is easily answered: Conscious intentions are all-important for the welfare analysis of signaling. Standard signaling models assume that people dislike sending the signal. It is this assumption that implies that signaling equilibria are highly inefficient - or even full-blown Prisoners' Dilemmas. If people enjoyed signaling, in contrast, signaling equilbria could easily be ideal. What superficially appears to be a vast zero-sum game turns out to be fine because the players like playing the game.... EconlogConsciousness is All-Important: The Case of SignalingBryan Caplan | Professor of Economics, George Mason University
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Mike Norman considers the following as important: economics and signaling, signaling
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I say the challenge in Robin's final sentence is easily answered: Conscious intentions are all-important for the welfare analysis of signaling. Standard signaling models assume that people dislike sending the signal. It is this assumption that implies that signaling equilibria are highly inefficient - or even full-blown Prisoners' Dilemmas. If people enjoyed signaling, in contrast, signaling equilbria could easily be ideal. What superficially appears to be a vast zero-sum game turns out to be fine because the players like playing the game.... EconlogConsciousness is All-Important: The Case of SignalingBryan Caplan | Professor of Economics, George Mason University
Topics:
Mike Norman considers the following as important: economics and signaling, signaling
This could be interesting, too:
Mike Norman writes Gabriel Popkin — Bacteria Use Brainlike Bursts of Electricity to Communicate
I say the challenge in Robin's final sentence is easily answered: Conscious intentions are all-important for the welfare analysis of signaling. Standard signaling models assume that people dislike sending the signal. It is this assumption that implies that signaling equilibria are highly inefficient - or even full-blown Prisoners' Dilemmas. If people enjoyed signaling, in contrast, signaling equilbria could easily be ideal. What superficially appears to be a vast zero-sum game turns out to be fine because the players like playing the game....Econlog
Consciousness is All-Important: The Case of Signaling
Bryan Caplan | Professor of Economics, George Mason University