by Targeted expenditure based on priorities determined by national security and aimed at neutralizing threats. In other words, defense rather than global power projection, like US-led NATO. The real expenditure, however, is not in nominal terms but with respect to allocation of real resources that are scarce, most significantly, knowledge and skill. Russia has established dominance in technological innovation in weapons development and manufacture. This requires investment in education and R&D.Sputnik InternationalPutin Explains Why Russia Can Afford to Spend Less on DefenceSee also Between 2000 and 2016, while the Chinese economy averaged official annual growth rates around 7-8 percent, the PLA’s budget grew even faster at 10 percent. Despite that, the PLA’s current roughly 0 billion
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Mike Norman considers the following as important: Russia, Russian economy, Russian military, technological innovation
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Sputnik International
Putin Explains Why Russia Can Afford to Spend Less on Defence
See also
Between 2000 and 2016, while the Chinese economy averaged official annual growth rates around 7-8 percent, the PLA’s budget grew even faster at 10 percent. Despite that, the PLA’s current roughly $200 billion dollar budget totals less than one-third of U.S. defense spending. However, China pays much lower costs for hardware and personnel because of China’s “latecomer advantage” as the DIA report explains:
“China has routinely adopted the best and most effective platforms found in foreign militaries through direct purchase, retrofits, or theft of intellectual property. By doing so, China has been able to focus on expediting its military modernization at a small fraction of the original cost.”
Prominent examples include China’s aircraft carriers and its J-11 jet fighters.
By 2017, Chinese defense spending growth declined to 5-7%percent and the PLA shed 300,000 personnel, bringing it down to 2 million-strong—still the largest armed force on the planet. This transition sought to remodel the PLA into a leaner, more flexible force suited for fast-paced modern warfare.…Actually, the nominal expenditure is lower than the US owing to differences in const. However, the cost in terms of real resources is the same. Real resources that are committed to military use, including exports, are not available for use in the domestic economy. So the cost in real resources per capita would have to be figured as real terms rather than in monetary terms. For example, China's military commitment of personnel is 2 million out of a billion people and that the US is one million out of 300 some million. The US is committing significantly more per capita to its armed services.
But this doesn't include related commitment, such as the arms industry, covert operations, etc. Some of those figures are classified. Moreover, it is impossible to tell what level of resources is being committed to black operations.
Finally, none of this is really germane to assessing power capability. The author has a degree in conflict resolution and apparently no background or training in military science. The question is not much much but how effective. For example, power projection is more costly than defense.
The US military and NATO is about force projection. China and Russia's militaries are orient toward national defense. In their case, asymmetry advantage lies in neutralizing potential adversaries' through technological weapons, like hypersonic missiles, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare.
It's not how many bucks, or even how much equipment, but rather the bang for the buck.
Based on this both China and Russia are modern military powers capable defending themselves against attack and protecting their periphery through denial of access. On the cheap.