by From Lars Syll The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a familiar concept to just about everyone who took Econ 101 … Yet no one’s ever actually run the experiment on real prisoners before, until two University of Hamburg economists tried it out in a recent study comparing the behavior of inmates and students. Surprisingly, for the classic version of the game, prisoners were far more cooperative than expected. Menusch Khadjavi and Andreas Lange put the famous game to the test for the first time ever, putting a group of prisoners in Lower Saxony’s primary women’s prison, as well as students, through both simultaneous and sequential versions of the game … They expected, building off of game theory and behavioral economic research that show humans are more cooperative than the purely rational model
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from Lars Syll
The “prisoner’s dilemma” is a familiar concept to just about everyone who took Econ 101 …
Yet no one’s ever actually run the experiment on real prisoners before, until two University of Hamburg economists tried it out in a recent study comparing the behavior of inmates and students.
Surprisingly, for the classic version of the game, prisoners were far more cooperative than expected.
Menusch Khadjavi and Andreas Lange put the famous game to the test for the first time ever, putting a group of prisoners in Lower Saxony’s primary women’s prison, as well as students, through both simultaneous and sequential versions of the game …
They expected, building off of game theory and behavioral economic research that show humans are more cooperative than the purely rational model that economists traditionally use, that there would be a fair amount of first-mover cooperation, even in the simultaneous simulation where there’s no way to react to the other player’s decisions.
And even in the sequential game, where you get a higher payoff for betraying a cooperative first mover, a fair amount will still reciprocate.
As for the difference between student and prisoner behavior, you’d expect that a prison population might be more jaded and distrustful, and therefore more likely to defect.
The results went exactly the other way …
The paper … demonstrates that prisoners aren’t necessarily as calculating, self-interested, and untrusting as you might expect, and as behavioral economists have argued for years, as mathematically interesting as Nash equilibrium might be, they don’t line up with real behavior all that well.
Many mainstream economists — still — think that game theory is useful and can be applied to real-life and give important and interesting results. That, however, is a rather unsubstantiated view. What game theory does is, strictly seen, nothing more than investigating the logic of behaviour among non-existant robot-imitations of humans. Knowing how those ‘rational fools’ play games do not help us to decide and act when interacting with real people. Knowing some game theory may actually make us behave in a way that hurts both ourselves and others. Decision-making and social interaction are always embedded in socio-cultural contexts. Not taking account of that, game theory will remain an analytical cul-de-sac that never will be able to come up with useful and relevant explanations.
Over-emphasizing the reach of instrumental rationality and abstracting away from the influence of many known to be important factors, reduces the analysis to a pure thought experiment without any substantial connection to reality. Limiting theoretical economic analysis in this way – not incorporating both motivational and institutional factors when trying to explain human behaviour – makes economics insensitive to social facts.
Game theorists extensively exploit ‘rational choice’ assumptions in their explanations. That is probably also the reason why game theory has not been able to accommodate well-known anomalies in its theoretical framework. That should hardly come as a surprise to anyone. Game theory with its axiomatic view on individuals’ tastes, beliefs, and preferences, cannot accommodate very much of real-life behaviour. It is hard to find really compelling arguments in favour of us continuing down its barren paths since individuals obviously do not comply with, or are guided by, game theory.
Apart from a few notable exceptions it is difficult to find really successful applications of game theory. Why? To a large extent simply because the boundary conditions of game theoretical models are false and baseless from a real-world perspective. And, perhaps even more importantly, since they are not even close to being good approximations of real-life, game theory is lacking predictive power. This should come as no surprise. As long as game theory sticks to its ‘rational choice’ foundations, there is not much to be hoped for.
Game theorists can, of course, marginally modify their tool-box and fiddle with the auxiliary assumptions to get whatever outcome they want. But as long as the ‘rational choice’ core assumptions are left intact, it seems a pointless effort of hampering with an already excessive deductive-axiomatic formalism. If you do believe in a real-world relevance of game theoretical ‘science fiction’ assumptions such as expected utility, ‘common knowledge,’ ‘backward induction,’ correct and consistent beliefs etc., etc., then adding things like ‘framing,’ ‘cognitive bias,’ and different kinds of heuristics, do not ‘solve’ any problem. If we want to construct a theory that can provide us with explanations of individual cognition, decisions, and social interaction, we have to look for something else.
Applications of game theory have on the whole resulted in massive predictive failures. People simply do not act according to the theory. They do not know or possess the assumed probabilities, utilities, beliefs or information to calculate the different (‘subgame,’ ‘tremblinghand perfect’) Nash equilibria. They may be reasonable and make use of their given cognitive faculties as well as they can, but they are obviously not those perfect and costless hyper-rational expected utility maximizing calculators game theory posits. And fortunately so. Being ‘reasonable’ make them avoid all those made-up ‘rationality’ traps that game theory would have put them in if they had tried to act as consistent players in a game theoretical sense.