Tag Archives: philosophy of science

Abduction in this sense is reasoning to the best explanation based on relevant information available. (The use of "abduction" by C. S. Peirce, the originator of the term, is somewhat different. See abductive reasoning) Math is an instrument of deduction. Deductive reasoning proceeds logically from a stipulated starting point, e.g., axioms, postulates, using deductive logic or mathematics. Abduction involves constructing conceptual or mathematical models based on what is given. To...

I was part of an epic Twitter thread yesterday, initially drawn in to a conversation about whether the word "mainstream" (vs "heterodox") was used in natural sciences (to which I said: not really, but the concept exists). There was one sub-thread that asked a question that is really more a history of science question (I am not a historian of science, so this is my own distillation of others' work as well a couple of my undergrad research papers). Useful relative to philosophy of science...

The other day, Rethinking Economics and the New Weather Institute published "33 theses" and metaphorically nailed them to the doors of the London School of Economics. They're re-published here. I think the "Protestant Reformation" metaphor they're going for is definitely appropriate: they're aiming to replace "neoclassical economics" — the Roman Catholic dogma in this metaphor — with a a pluralistic set of different dogmas — the various dogmas of the Protestant denominations (Lutheran,...

Math is purely formal, involving the relation of signs based on formation and transformation rules. Signs are given significance based on definitions. Math is applicable to the world through science to the degree that the definitions are amenable to measurement and the model assumptions approximate real world conditions (objects in relation to others) and events (patterned changes in these relations). Methodological choices determine the scope and scale of the model, which in turn...

When giving courses in the philosophy of science yours truly has often had David Papineau’s book Philosophical Devices (OUP 2012) on the reading list. Overall it is a good introduction to many of the instruments used when performing methodological and science theoretical analyses of economic and other social sciences issues. Unfortunately, the book has also fallen prey to the randomization hype that scourges sciences nowadays.... Lars P. Syll’s BlogRandomization — a philosophical device...

As shown over and over again when significance tests are applied, people have a tendency to read ‘not disconfirmed’ as ‘probably confirmed.’ Standard scientific methodology tells us that when there is only say a 10 % probability that pure sampling error could account for the observed difference between the data and the null hypothesis, it would be more ‘reasonable’ to conclude that we have a case of disconfirmation. Especially if we perform many independent tests of our hypothesis and they...

AbstractIn science publishing and many areas of research, the status quo is a lexicographic decision rule in which any result is first required to have a p-value that surpasses the 0.05 threshold and only then is consideration—often scant—given to such factors as prior and related evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by research domain. There have been recent proposals to change the...

Paul Rosenbaum’s 1999 paper “Choice as an Alternative to Control in Observational Studies” is really thoughtful and well-written. The comments and rejoinder include an interesting exchange between Manski and Rosenbaum on external validity and the role of theories.... Important in the most studies in social science, including economics, are necessarily observational rather than experimental. The question is how to design observational studies to make them as close as possible to experimental...

Everyone is familiar with the nostrum, "correlation is not causality." Simply put, correlation can potentially identify input-output relationships with a certain degree of probability. But the relationship is a "black box."Causal explanation involves opening the box and examining the contents. Correlation shows that something happens; causality in science explains how it happens, elucidating transmission in terms of operations. In formal systems the operators are rules, e.g., expressible...

Important from the perspective of philosophy of science.Perhaps the most significant line is the last one: What is needed is new mathematics that will render these notions scientific,” he said. Then, perhaps, we’ll understand what we’ve been arguing about for so long. Recall that Newton had to develop the calculus as a new mathematical notation in order to express his discoveries in classical physics.Quanta MagazineQuantum Theory Rebuilt From Simple Physical Principles Philip Ball