[unable to retrieve full-text content]There are a huge number of anomalies and biases which can be understood as confusing the claims that the probability of p conditional on q is high if the conditional probability of q conditional on p is high. One is diagnostic expectations – the conditional probability that a person has red hair if the person […] The post Direction of Implication of high probability appeared first on Angry Bear.
Read More »Lars P. Syll — On the applicability of statistics in social sciences
David Salsburg quote.Lars P. Syll’s BlogOn the applicability of statistics in social sciences Lars P. Syll | Professor, Malmo University
Read More »Andrew Gelman — Our hypotheses are not just falsifiable; they’re actually false.
On the practical side of philosophy of science. Adding nuance to Karl Popper on falsification. Further argument for the view that theories are useful but not "true." This may seem to contradict the realist view that theories are general descriptions of causal relationships. But I don't think that this is what is is implied. Rather, useful theories can be viewed as fitting the data because they reveal underlying structures that are not observed directly but only indirectly. There is a...
Read More »Lars P. Syll — Truth and probability
Keynes and the fundamentals of probability.Lars P. Syll’s BlogTruth and probabilityLars P. Syll | Professor, Malmo University
Read More »G.A. Barnard: The “catch-all” factor: probability vs likelihood — Debate between G. A. Barnard and Leonard Jimmie Savage
Similar to there Bayesian versus frequentist debate in statistical reasoning.Likelihood Principle My epistemological view on this is that the border between them is fuzzy and needs to be approached on a case by case basis, along with acknowledging a cognitive bias toward greater certainty than is attainable from the given and the reasoning about it. Humans don't like uncertainty and have a strong bias toward minimizing it at the risk of fooling themselves. Even statisticians....
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